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WHAT ROLE SHOULD THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PLAY 
IN CONSUMER PROTECTION? 
David Cohen* 
The purpose of these remarks is to comment on and to reinforce 
many of the points made by Professor Neilson in his "Comment on 
the Recent Federal Proposals for the Rationalization of Trade 
Practices Regulation in Canada".' More broadly, I would like to 
take this opportunity to reflect on the motives and agenda of the 
current policies and constitutional reform proposals which address 
the role which the federal government should play in consumer 
protection generally. 
In reading Professor Neilson's paper and in thinking about the 
broader questions in it, it soon became apparent that one cannot 
analyze the role of the federal government in consumer protection 
without simultaneously asking about the role of alternative 
regulatory institutions - in our case, provincial governments, the 
market and other national governments. There cannot be a 
regulatory vacuum in public policy. 
Before addressing these questions directly, it is important to 
establish, at least for the purposes of this discussion, what we 
mean by "consumer protection". Simplistic, embarrassingly 
paternalistic, and ultimately frustrating consumer-protection 
initiatives of a quarter century ago have given way to an appreci- 
ation of the difficulty which governments face in "protecting" 
consumers from organized economic power in markets. In 1965, 
consumer protection policy meant creating abstract legal rights, 
and perhaps expanding legal services in an effort to enhance access 
to traditional redress mechanisms by consumers. Today, it is fair 
to say, consumer protection means: 
Professor of Law, University of British Columbia. This is a revised version of a comment 
prepared by the author for presentation at the 21st Annual Workshop on Commercial and 
Consumer Law held at the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto on October 25-26,1991. 
Supra, this Journal, p. 70. 
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1. effective protection against consumer misrepresentation and 
fraud in marketing practices;2 
2. the provision of information in consumer markets to reduce 
transaction costs and remedy market inperfections;3 
3. the development of consumer insurance  programme^;^ 
4. the development of licensing and associated regulatory 
measures in consumer services - notably banking, insurance, 
and medical and legal services - where it is difficult, if not 
impossible, for consumers to evaluate service quality and 
where the risks to the consumer are substantial if the firm or 
transaction fails ;5 
5. product safety regulation;6 
6. protection of the interests of consumers in bankruptcy 
proceedings; and 
7. the provision of effective consumer redress mechanisms. 
In this comment I would like to approach in three different ways 
the question of the role of the federal government in delivering 
consumer protection services. First, one can think of the 
regulatory status of the federal government in the area of 
consumer protection in absolute terms. That is, if one assumes 
that the federal government has complete authority to address 
consumer protection issues, one can ask whether the federal 
government should play a more or less active role in regulating 
consumer markets. 
Second, one can think of the role of the federal government in 
relative terms within the Canadian political environment. That is, 
The major federal initiative in this area consists of the misleading advertising provisions in 
the Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, as amended, ss. 52 to60. 
3 The information may relate to specific qualities of a consumer product or  service. In 
addition, the government can institute systematic product quality and grading standards 
as a means of reducing transaction costs. The federal government's role in product 
packaging and labelling, textile labelling, and precious metal marking comes within this 
sub-category. See Consumer Packaging and Labelling Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-38; Textile 
Labelling Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-10; Precious Metals Marking Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-19. 
See Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-3. 
5The federal government's activity in this arena has been limited to the licensing and 
regulation of federally chartered banks, trust companies and insurance companies. See 
Bank Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-1; Trust Companies Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-20. 
The regulatory activities of the Product Safety Branch of the Department of Consumer 
and Corporate Affairs under the Hazardous Products Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-3 and the 
Tobacco Products Control Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 14 (4th Supp.), as well as the activities of 
the Department of Health and Welfare pursuant to the Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1985, 
c. F-27, are examples of this category. 
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one can inquire into the implications of a decision to devolve to the 
provinces administrative responsibility or constitutional authority 
to deliver consumer protection through the regulation of 
consumer markets.' 
And third, one can think of the role of the federal and provincial 
governments in relative terms within a North American and 
perhaps international economic environment. That is, one might 
assess the role of the federal and provincial governments in 
consumer protection given the increased internationalization of 
financial, product and service markets. 
Before the first question - whether the federal government 
should adopt a more interventionist stance in delivering 
"consumer protection services" - can be answered, recent 
federal government activity must be reviewed. It has become 
clear, during the past decade, that the current federal government 
has little interest in taking an active role in many issues which 
come within a consumer protection portfolio. The Product Safety 
Branch of the Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs 
has been notably silent, at least in so far as overt regulatory inter- 
vention is concerned, since 1982. The consumer interest in 
bankruptcy reform, most notably in the protection of pre-paying 
buyers, has not been reflected in recent bankruptcy reform 
proposals. The recent Guidelines on Environmentally Related 
Advertising issued by the Product Labelling Branch of Consumer 
and Corporate Affairs are embarrassingly weak and largely 
ineffective. 
As Professor Neilson indicates, we have seen a retreat from the 
active enforcement of misleading advertising regulation at the 
national level. In addition, earlier efforts to develop a federal 
securities market in Canada have not proved successful.8 While we 
recognize that capital "knows no boundaries", provinces are 
entrusted with the impossible task of regulating financial institu- 
7 It is commonly accepted that in the latter part of the 20th century, the provincial and 
federal governments have exercised concurrent jurisdiction over consumer protection 
issues largely because many of the regulatory initiatives represent policy areas which do 
not fit nicely within the categories set out in the 1867 British North America Act. See 
Norrie, Simeon and Krasnick, Federalism and the Economic Union (1986), pp. 49-59. 
8 Notwithstanding the fact that securities markets are becoming international in operation, 
shareholder protection responsibilities are increasingly the responsibility of provincial 
governments. As a result, there is the corresponding expense from duplication in 
regulatory intervention, risks of interprovincial activities escaping the purview of any 
regulatory authority, and risk of conflict in multi-provincial enforcement actions. 
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tions, the investment activities of which cannot be adequately 
assessed or monitored in so far as they are directly affected by 
extra-provincial influences.9 
Standing back from the fray, one might infer that the federal 
government has taken the view that regulatory responsibility for 
consumer protection can and should be left to the provinces or 
perhaps to the market. That decision is an easy surrender to those 
provinces which are demanding greater regulatory power and 
responsibility. As well, it is consistent with recent federal privati- 
zation initiatives in those provinces which fail to act. Thus we are 
left with the market as our regulatory instrument. The recent 
constitutional reform proposals which indicate a willingness on the 
part of the current federal government to continue and perhaps to 
accelerate and make irrevocable this retreat, while disturbing, are 
consistent with the policies and operations of the federal 
government in recent years.1° 
However, while the federal government retreats from its 
current constitutional authority to regulate consumer markets, 
most provincial governments cannot realistically be expected to 
take up the sword, so to speak, on behalf of consumers. Provincial 
governments must operate within a political and economic context 
which severely constrains their ability to act. In particular, 
consumer protection initiatives must be introduced in an 
economic environment where consumer financial markets, service 
markets and product markets are becoming increasingly interpro- 
vincial and international in scope. 
The past 20 years has seen the expansion of legal, financial, 
insurance and accounting services across provincial boundaries 
and across national boundaries as well. Manufacturing is being 
restructured in an international arena to respond to national 
comparative advantages in technology and labour costs and the 
economies of scale associated with production for world or multi- 
national markets. Companies producing consumer goods or 
providing consumer services in one Canadian province have to 
operate in a national and international environment in terms of 
the location in which the goods are produced, the source of 
financing for the production of the goods, and the international 
markets in which their goods must compete. 
See McGauley v.  British Columbia (1990), 44 B.C.L.R.  (2d) 217 (S.C.), leave to appeal 
granted24 A.C.W.S. (3d)476. 
lo See Federal Proposals for Constitutional Reform (1991), Part 111, para. 26. 
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If I am correct in my assertion that consumer markets are 
increasingly national and international in scope, the serious impli- 
cations of a federal retreat from regulatory intervention - 
whether temporarily as a matter of policy or irrevocably as a 
matter of constitutional reform - become clear. The abdication 
by the federal government of its regulatory responsibilities in 
these areas does not mean that the provinces can or will step in and 
fill the void. 
For example, if the federal government cannot find the 
resources to address the misleading advertising activities of 
national and international firms, it is unlikely that most provincial 
governments will be able to do any better. The ability of a "local" 
government to engage in regulatory intervention different from 
that of its political competitors is directly related to the market 
power of the economy within which that provincial government 
operates.ll Provincial initiatives which do not closely parallel 
those of Ontario and Quebec may do little more than persuade the 
relevant industry or business to stop serving the relevant market. l2 
Advocates of provincial constitutional authority seem to ignore 
the fact that they cannot direct the output of capital and product 
markets to their citizens. The advantages of economies of scale 
associated with federal action over a broad range of consumer- 
protection activities, most notably standard-setting and product- 
labelling, will be forgone if authority over those matters is 
devolved to the provinces.13 
My thesis is not a complicated one. I cannot think of any policy 
consideration which would argue in favour of further decentrali- 
zation of legislative authority to direct consumer policy in Canada. 
There are no serious justifications which can be offered for 
expanding provincial authority over consumer protection matters. 
11 I should note that, except at the extreme, consumer protection initiatives which involve 
the enactment of legal rights consisting of damage actions are not subject to this 
constraint. Thus Saskatchewan and New Brunswick, two of the smallest consumer 
markets in Canada, were able to enact very progressive consumer sales legislation more 
than a decade ago with no apparent adverse consequences to consumer markets in those 
jurisdictions. See Consumer Product Warranty and Liability Act, S.N.B. 1978, c. C-18.1 
and the Consumer Products Warranties Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. C-30. 
12 Of course, the same can be said of Ontario in relation to the consumer-protection policies 
of any of the northeastern states or the federal government in the United States. 
13 It is difficult to see the advantages in the formulation, co-ordination and enforcement of 
10 divergent standard or labelling regimes. Indeed this is one area of consumer 
protection where the federal government, in the interests of creating a "more perfect 
economic union", has deemed it appropriate to retain its constitutional jurisdiction. 
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One common argument in favour of designing constitutional 
arrangements to allocate legislative power to the provinces is that 
the community which is calling for regulatory intervention exists at 
the provincial rather than federal level. The commonality of 
interests among members of a group, the sense that "we" means 
people within a province rather than within the nation, can and 
does justify provincial legislative authority in many cases.14 For 
example, governments regulating trade practices must make 
difficult but necessary tradeoffs which recognize, for example, the 
cost to producers of ensuring accurate information and the ability 
of a diverse population of consumers to interpret necessarily 
ambiguous and incomplete information. Many of us, reflecting on 
who should regulate in this area, conclude that the choices 
required in developing misleading advertising policy should be 
made by the political representatives of those groups. 
Similarly, developing product-safety standards involves 
mediating between the interests of actors in private and public 
medical insurance programmes and the interests of members of 
the community adversely affected by product-safety risks, 
reflecting both their attitudes towards risk and their sense of the 
importance of sharing personal injury losses across all members of 
the community. Throughout this balancing act the technical and 
financial ability of industry to respond to regulatory intervention 
must be taken into account. Again, an argument can be made that 
this process should be the responsibility of the political representa- 
tives of those groups. The result, given the unique history, culture, 
social, political and legal institutions and economic circumstances 
of sovereign political units, are consumer protection policies 
which can and should differ from country to country. 
But I cannot accept that that argument holds across Canadian 
provinces. Do Nova Scotians and Manitobans differ so much in 
their attitudes towards product safety, or their interest and ability 
to process consumer-product information, or their concern about 
sharing the losses of other members of their respective commu- 
nities, that those differences ought to be reflected in political 
autonomy to regulate in those areas? Certainly, as Andrew Petter 
has argued, "the opinions and priorities of Canadians in one 
region may well differ from those of Canadians in other 
regions".15 But I cannot believe that this is true in respect of the 
l4 See R. Simeon, "Criteria for Choice in Federal Systems", [I9831 Queens L. Rev. 131. 
See A.  Petter, "Meech Ado About Nothing? Federalism, Democracy and the Spending 
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values implicated in consumer protection policies of the kind we 
are considering here. 
I do not believe that the provinces have been demanding consti- 
tutional authority to regulate in many of the traditional areas of 
consumer protection. I would think, given the internationalization 
of financial and consumer markets, that few provinces could 
believe that their respective economic bases would be sufficient to 
support political agendas which differed significantly from those 
of their political and economic competitors. 
All of this leads us to the position articulated by Professor 
Neilson - that both functionalism and pragmatism suggest a role 
for the provinces in consumer protection which is limited to those 
relatively narrow matters which can most efficiently be performed 
by governments at the provincial level.l6 However, business 
interests can legitimately claim that their ability to compete in 
international markets is hampered by provincial standard-setting 
activities. There is no evidence that provincial governments would 
be more sensitive to the conditions which produce personal losses 
experienced by consumers in market transactions. These kinds of 
functionalist arguments suggest that provincial activity should be 
focused on the provision of effective redress at the local level for 
violation of legal standards whether legislative or contractual; the 
regulation of local service industries though licensing standards 
and insurance programmes; and the establishment of mandatory 
"default" contract terms in consumer product and service 
contracts. All of this is extremely important and, as Professor 
Neilson recognizes, is now undoubtedly within provincial legis- 
lative competence. l7 
What then is the explanation for a federal initiative to give the 
provinces more legislative authority than they currently exercise? 
The conclusion I have reached is an admittedly cynical one, but it 
does recognize that few provinces seem to be demanding this grant 
of legislative authority. Edward Belobaba recognized several 
Power", in Swinton and Rogerson, eds., Competing Constitutional Visions: The Meech 
Lake Accord (1988), at p. 176. 
'6See A.  Scott, "An Economic Approach to the Federal Structure" in Options: 
Proceedings of the Conference on the Future of the Canadian Federation (Toronto, 
University of Toronto Press, 1977), at p. 270. 
17 One additional role for the provincial governments might be to participate in a more 
active federal-provincial inter-governmental policy instrument which would ensure that 
consumer interests are adequately represented in the federal arena. 
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years ago that the organization of corporate lobbying on consumer 
protection issues focuses on the federal government:'* 
At the federal level, the strength of the business lobby ensured the failure of 
the proposed amendments to our competition law, of suggestions to 
redesign federal regulation of advertising, [and] of the federal proposal for a 
comprehensive borrowers and depositors protection law. 
It is this, I think, which explains Professor Neilson's data 
indicating an enforcement strategy which has resulted in less than 
14% of the federal government's case load involving "interpro- 
vincial or national practices or impacts of any significance beyond 
local markets". If that is true, then one might despair that the 
same corporate lobby will, in the future, be able to confront the 
governments of Manitoba or Nova Scotia should they engage in 
dramatic consumer protection initiatives.lg And while an 
offsetting consumer public interest lobby in the federal arena is at 
best weak, it simply does not exist in many of the provinces. At the 
same time that production and distribution of consumer goods 
become a truly international phenomenon -with product design, 
material inputs, component production and ultimate manufac- 
turing taking place in a number of jurisdictions -we see a delib- 
erate attempt by the federal government to ask the provinces to 
take on a responsibility which I do not believe they can meet. 
However, that story is only one of many. If the provinces cannot 
or will not take on the regulatory agenda which is being handed to 
them by the federal government, and if they are unable to obtain 
l8 E.P. Belobaba, "The Development of Consumer Protection Regulation: 1945 to 1984", 
in Consumer Protection, Environmental Law and Corporate Power, Ivan Bernier and 
Andree Lajoie, eds. (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1984), at p. 37. 
19 It may be, however, that the provinces are better able than the federal government to 
take a more active role in consumer protection. Certainly, one can point to a record in 
many provinces which includes the enactment of farm implement legislation, mortgage 
relief legislation, seize or sue legislation, trade practice legislation, and class action legis- 
lation, much of which has a strong interprovincial character to it. This record suggests, 
somewhat paradoxically, that the functionalist argument which suggests that the 
provinces ought to be entrusted with authority over only local matters has not been taken 
far enough. That is, pragmatic arguments which focus only on the economic character of 
the relevant transaction support Professor Neilson's thesis. However, if those arguments 
are extended to take into account the nature of the political process through which the 
legislative and regulatory activity must be filtered, we may be led to the conclusion that 
the provinces are better situated to  address so called "national" consumer protection 
issues where they are insulated from the power of "national" corporate lobbying efforts 
due to the particular distribution of production facilities and employment across the 
country. 
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the resources to do so, then the regulatory instrument which we 
can expect to address consumer protection concerns is the market. 
Jacob Ziegel wrote in 1981 that "the 1980s will be a period of 
consolidation if not active retrenchment" in consumer 
legislation.20 History has proven him correct. Yet recent events 
would appear to take deregulation one step further. Proposals to 
constitutionalize the devolution of authority over consumer 
protection issues are in fact proposals to make effectively irrevo- 
cable the current federal government's abdication of responsibility 
in this context. One might, on reflection, support the assertion 
that the federal government was right when it decided that no 
substantial consumer protection initiative has been justified in 
recent years. But are we so absolutely certain of that that we 
would make it part of our constitutional identity? 
20 J .  Ziegel and B. Geva, Commercial and Consumer Transactions: Cases, Texts and 
Materials (Toronto, Emond-Montgomery, 1981), p. 21. 
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